Bill 556.

Summary.

The bill establishes a framework to prevent monopolistic and oligopolistic practices and abuses of a dominant position in telecommunications, protect consumers, and promote quality services at fair prices. It would apply to concession holders, operators, suppliers, and providers of public telecommunications services; companies connected to relevant markets in the sector; concentration transactions; and essential infrastructure within the national territory. It defines, among other concepts, the relevant market, economic concentration, dominant operator, asymmetric regulation, and functional separation. Its application would be governed by the principles of effective competition, minimal intervention, proportionality, user protection, legal certainty, and technically grounded decisions. It declares universal, continuous, efficient, and reasonably priced access to these services to be a matter of national public interest.

Operators designated as having significant market power could be subject to temporary rate regulation, infrastructure sharing, nondiscriminatory access to essential networks, greater contractual transparency, and functional separation. Those controlling essential infrastructure would have to allow other operators access under the rules of the National Public Services Authority (Autoridad Nacional de los Servicios Públicos). A share of 40% or more of subscribers or gross revenue in a relevant market would give rise to a presumption of significant market power, subject to technical assessment and the right to a defense. Concentration transactions exceeding 25% would require prior authorization from the National Public Services Authority and the Consumer Protection and Competition Defense Authority (Autoridad de Protección al Consumidor y Defensa de la Competencia). The former would conduct a public competition study every 2 years.

Where effective competition is lacking, the National Public Services Authority could temporarily impose rate caps, rate reductions, or mandatory social plans. A national index would measure actual versus contracted speed, stability, coverage, and response to service failures; its results would be public and binding. Failure to meet the guaranteed minimum quality would trigger an automatic discount on the next bill. Ambiguous or disproportionate “fair use” clauses would be prohibited, clear contracts would be required, and users could switch operators without penalty when a failure to meet quality standards is established. Operators would publish service and complaint indicators monthly. The State could establish incentives for new operators.

Anticompetitive practices would be subject to fines of up to 10% of annual gross revenue. The bill identifies very serious violations, criteria for setting fines, and interim measures during investigations. In serious and repeated cases, subject to due process, functional separation, proportionate divestiture, or partial revocation of a concession could be ordered. Investigations into abuse of a dominant position would receive priority treatment and have a maximum duration of 6 months, with access to the case file, evidence, a public hearing, and reconsideration. The Executive Branch (Órgano Ejecutivo) would issue implementing regulations within 6 months of the law’s promulgation, at which point it would enter into force. The provisions concern the cited authorities, telecommunications operators, their competitors, and users.